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1 Introduction
Recently, there has been a great deal of research into the demand for redistribution and
its determinants. However, this research focuses on preferences for the total amount of
redistribution and its economic, institutional, and behavioral determinants while neglecting
preferences for the composition of the redistributive budget. Some recent examples are
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Alesina and Giuliano (2010), Neustadt and Zweifel (2009),
and Neustadt (2011). One notable exception is a study by Boeri et al. (2002) based on
Contingent Valuation (CV) experiments. However, a weakness of the CV approach is that
it holds all the attributes of the good in question constant, varying its price only. This
is not descriptive of actual decision making, where other attributes almost always vary
along with price; moreover, it invites strategic responses because respondents can focus
on a single attribute. In this paper, other attributes of importance will be shown to be
the nationality of beneficiary (Swiss, citizens of Western European countries, citizens of
other countries) and the uses of the money available for redistribution (old-age pensioners,
people with ill health, the unemployed, working poor, families with children).
In contrast to CV, the methodology of Discrete Choice Experiments (DCE) used in
this study allows the creation of realistic decision-making scenarios by making respondents
choose between alternatives where all attributes vary, among them, price. The two main
findings are that willingness to pay (WTP) for redistribution favors families with children
(rather than people with ill health, for instance) to the detriment of all other uses and
favors Swiss nationals to the detriment of foreigners.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a literature
review from which hypotheses to be tested are derived. The first set of hypotheses concerns
the different uses of the redistribution budget and the second set, the nationality of the
potential beneficiaries. Section 3 presents a general description of the method of DCEs
as well as the design of the present experiment. Descriptive statistics of the experiment
follow in Section 4, and hypothesis tests, in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes the results
and concludes with implications for public policy.
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2 Literature Review and Statement of Hypotheses
This section first presents research that defines the general background of this paper and
then moves on to contributions that lead to a set of specific hypotheses to be tested.
2.1 General Determinants of the Demand for Income Redistri-
bution
In their reviews, Alesina and Giuliano (2010) and Akkoyunlu et al. (2009) identify a wide set
of factors influencing preferences for public income redistribution that can be categorized
as economic, political, and behavioral. As to the economic determinants, Alesina and
La Ferrara (2005) empirically analyzed the effects of current and future income on the
demand for redistribution in the United States. While low current income bolsters demand,
chances for a higher future income reduce it provided the tax system is progressive. As
suggested by the social contract literature, citizens’ preferences for redistribution can also
be interpreted as preferences for insurance by risk-averse individuals [cf. Rawls (1999)]. In a
hypothetical situation, where individuals do not yet know their endowment nor their future
position in society (‘veil of ignorance’), demand for redistribution is predicted because it
provides an income transfer from more favorable future states to less favorable ones. Beck
(1994) investigates individual behavior under the ’veil of ignorance’ in an experiment.
Using lotteries to represent a hypothetical society with random differences in individual
incomes, he analyzes the amount of desired income redistribution. Individuals indeed
display risk aversion, albeit not of the extreme kind as implied by the Rawlsian maximin
rule. Furthermore, their preference for income redistribution does not exceed the level
that can be explained by individual risk aversion. This result provides the foundation for
Hypotheses 2 to 5 stated in Section 2.3.
As to the political determinants, the literature [Persson and Tabellini (2000, 2003);
Lizzeri and Persico (2001); Milesi-Ferretti et al. Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002)] predicts that
proportional representation causes a tendency towards universal programs benefitting var-
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ious groups (old-age pensioners, working poor, minorities, etc.), while majority rule results
in targeted ‘pork barrel’ programs. Persson and Tabellini (2003) find supporting empirical
evidence in that countries with proportional representation have a share of government
expenditure in GDP that ceteris paribus is 5 percentage points higher than those with
majority rule. Moreover, according to Akkoyunlu et al. (2009) there are signs of a positive
correlation between the degree of proportional representation and the share of transfers in
GDP among OECD countries. Additional political determinants of redistribution include
two-party vs. multiparty system, presidential vs. parliamentary democracy, and direct vs.
representative democracy, with two-party systems, presidential, and direct democracies all
predicted to induce less public redistribution.
Among the behavioral determinants of income redistribution, beliefs have been at the
center of attention. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) develop a model where society’s belief
whether effort or luck determines economic success is responsible for multiple self-fulfilling
equilibria, while Benabou and Tirole (2006) propose a model for the emergence and per-
sistence of such collective beliefs. On the empirical side, Fong (2001) presents evidence in
line with Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) suggesting that beliefs about the role of luck in
determining economic success are an important explanatory variable in the demand for re-
distribution. Their importance could be conditioned by a concern for incentives, however.
If effort determines income, then an increased income tax rate for financing redistribution
causes a loss of output due to weakened work incentives. Yet, Fong (2001) finds that such
concerns do not modify the link between beliefs and the demand for redistribution. Using
fiscal data, Corneo and Fong (2008) estimate willingness to pay (WTP) for distributive
justice in the United States, finding that it amounts to about one-fifth of disposable house-
hold income. However, there are indications of marked preference heterogeneity between
racial and income groups.
Boeri et al. (2001) study attitudes towards redistribution with a focus on pension and
unemployment schemes in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, using CV experiments that
impose an explicit trade-off between income and social insurance coverage on respondents.
They find opposition against an extension of the welfare state, with conflicts between young
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and old, rich and poor, and insiders and outsiders creating significant hurdles to welfare
reform.
Neustadt and Zweifel (2009, 2015) and Neustadt (2011) elicit preferences concerning
the total volume of income redistribution. According to a specification relating choices to
the attributes of redistribution without socioeconomic covariates, the average Swiss citi-
zen would have to be paid a compensation of CHF 11.78 (some US$ 12) per month (0.72
percent of monthly income) for an additional percentage point of GDP devoted to public
redistribution. In addition, a very marked status quo bias would have to be overcome by
payment of another 5.27 percent of monthly income. WTP for redistribution is estimated
to be maximum at 21 rather than the current 25 percent of GDP. Furthermore, Neustadt
and Zweifel (2009) test several hypotheses concerning the effects of economic well-being
on the demand for redistribution without any confounding supply-side influences. WTP
for redistribution is shown to increase with income and education, contradicting the stan-
dard economic model [Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), Meltzer and Richard (1981)]. The
Prospect of Upward Mobility hypothesis [Hirschman and Rothschild (1973), Benabou and
Ok (2001)] receives very partial empirical support. Finally, Neustadt (2011) studies pref-
erence heterogeneity with respect to cultural and religious beliefs, confirming the negative
relationship between the degree of religiosity and WTP for redistribution.
2.2 Recipients’ Nationality and Preferences for Redistribution
In this paper, we elicit preferences for different compositions of the redistribution portfolio,
i.e. the slicing of the total redistribution pie. Firstly, we consider the following three groups
of transfer recipients in terms of their nationalities: Swiss citizens, Western European
citizens, and citizens of other countries. The behavioral explanations of redistribution
emphasize imperfect altruism [Fong et al. (2006)]. While perfect altruism is exclusively
governed by recipients’ preferences, imperfect altruism also reflects donor preferences. In
particular, potential donors are predicted to oppose public welfare if they believe that
recipients take advantage of the system, a behavior that often is attributed to members of
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ethnic minorities, who are the result of recent immigration to Switzerland.
A distinction between Swiss citizens, Western European immigrants, and immigrants
from other countries is also suggested by the insurance motive (see Section 2.1). In view
of its low rate of unemployment, members of the first group are most likely to contribute
to public redistribution through taxes and contributions to social security, followed by the
second group with their somewhat higher rate of unemployment, and the third, whose rate
of unemployment is above average1. The same ranking is suggested by cultural distance.
The predicted preference structure is as follows. The demand for redistribution in favor of
one’s own group is expected to be highest. Western Europeans are next because they are
not over-represented among the poor, contrary to citizens from the Balkan states, Africa,
and South America who together account for the bulk of immigrants from the rest of the
world.
Hypothesis 1: Demand for redistribution in favor of Swiss citizens is expected to be
highest, followed by Western Europeans and by the rest of the world.
In principle, it would be appropriate to distinguish between Swiss and foreign-born
respondents in the DCE because foreign-born respondents might have a different ranking
from that indicated in Hypothesis 1. However, since 94 percent of the respondents are
born in the country (see Section 4.1), the pertinent subsample is too small to permit valid
statistical inference.
2.3 Types of Beneficiaries and Preferences for Redistribution
Next, we consider the following five types of transfer recipients: old-age pensioners, people
in ill health, the unemployed, working poor, and families with children. In view of the
insurance motivation for redistribution proposed by Beck (1994), the ordering of the risks
confronting an individual is of crucial importance. In Switzerland, the ‘risk’ of living up
to retirement age (65 for men, 63 for women) is 85 percent for a 20 year old male and 97
percent for a 20 year old female, respectively [BFS (2005)]. However, this risk is highly
1see blog.tagesanzeiger.ch/datenblog/index.php/818
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insured because mandatory public and employment-related provision together guarantee
about 60 percent of pre-retirement income. The highest uninsured ‘risk’ is to be in a
household with children; it amounts to 33 percent as of 2000 [BFS (2008)]. Information
on the working poor (another uninsured risk) is not available; however, for persons with
no education beyond minimum schooling, the share of households with incomes below the
poverty level (defined as 60 percent of the median adjusted for household size) is 29 percent
[BFS (2010)]. As to the risk of ill health, a recent survey found that 28 percent of the
respondents in the Swiss canton of Fribourg felt chronically ill [OBSAN (2010)]. However,
at least the financial consequences of chronic illness are largely covered by mandatory
health insurance. Finally, unemployment has always been below 4 percent since 2010 and
not much higher before [SECO (2010)], and it is largely insured as well. Therefore, one
can state the following hypotheses with regard to the types of beneficiaries,
Hypothesis 2: Demand for redistribution is expected to be highest in favor of families
with children, followed by the working poor. As groups to be favored, pensioners, people
with ill health, and the unemployed are predicted to follow at some distance due to generous
insurance coverage.
In addition, the insurance view of redistribution suggests a set of hypotheses concerning
the demand for redistribution by specific subsets of the population.
Hypothesis 3: Demand for redistribution in favor of old-age pensioners is expected to
be highest among respondents near and beyond the retirement age.
Hypothesis 4: Demand for redistribution in favor of the unemployed is expected to be
higher among respondents who expect to become or stay unemployed, compared to others.
Hypothesis 5: Demand for redistribution in favor of people in ill health is expected to
be higher among respondents who experience health problems themselves or have relatives
with health problems, compared to others.
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3 Discrete Choice Experiments
3.1 Theoretical Foundations
Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) are designed to measure individuals’ preferences for
characteristics of commodities, the so-called attributes. In contradistinction with classical
Revealed Preference Theory, originating with Samuelson (1938), DCEs allow individuals
to express their preferences for non-marketed as well as hypothetical products. During a
DCE, respondents are repeatedly asked to compare the status quo with several hypothetical
alternatives defined by their attributes including price. By varying the levels of attributes,
a set of product alternatives is generated. Since a rational individual always chooses the
alternative with the highest utility, the researcher can infer the utility associated with the
attributes from observed choices. The proposed method, derived from the New Demand
Theory of Lancaster (1971), is also known as Conjoint Analysis [Louviere et al. (2000)]. It
constitutes a multi-attribute valuation method [Merino-Castello (2003)].
The most prominent alternative to a DCE is Contingent Valuation (CV). A certain
situation or product is described in detail, and respondents are asked to indicate their
maximum WTP for this fixed product. Only its price is varied, contrary to Conjoint
Analysis where all relevant attributes are varied simultaneously. While in a DCE the
product is described in less detail than in a typical CV experiment, many product varieties
can be created by varying the levels of relevant attributes [Louviere et al. (2000), p. 344].
This permits to take into account trade-offs among attributes and to estimate WTP values
of individual attributes (see below). Furthermore, strategic behavior of respondents is less
likely than in CV with its exclusive emphasis on price, which facilitates strategic behavior.
Finally, biases that easily occur when individuals are directly asked about their WTP are
less frequently observed in DCEs [Ryan (2004)].
A particular advantage of a DCE in the present context is that it permits to explicitly
impose the budget constraint through a price attribute in the guise of the tax share of
income used to finance the transfers considered. Respondents can be made to simultane-
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ously choose this share and hence the ‘size of the pie’ and its ‘slices’ devoted to different
types of recipients (individuals in ill health, old age, etc.). Thus, trade-offs among different
attributes of the good ‘redistribution’ can be determined, resulting in an assessment of
their relative importance.
The econometric method used is based on Random Utility Theory [see Luce (1959),
Manski and Lerman (1977) and McFadden (1974, 1981, 2001)]. Thus, individual i values
alternative j according to the utility Vij attained, which is given by
Vij = vi(aj , pj, yi, si, εij). (1)
Here, vi(·) denotes i’s indirect utility function, aj , the amount of attributes associated with
alternative j, and pj, the price. The individual’s income and sociodemographic character-
istics are symbolized by yi and si, respectively. Finally, εij denotes the error term, which is
due to the fact that the experimenter never observes all arguments entering vi, imparting
a stochastic element to observed choices. As usual, the utility function is additively split
into a systematic component w(·) and a stochastic one,
Vij = wi(aj , pj, yi, si) + εij.
Individual i will prefer alternative j to alternative l if and only if
wi(al, pl, yi, si) + εil ≤ wi(aj , pj, yi, si) + εij. (2)
Due to the presence of the stochastic term, only the probability Pij of individual i choosing
alternative j rather than alternative l can be estimated, with
Pij = Prob [wi(al, pl, yi, si) + εil ≤ wi(aj , pj, yi, si) + εij ] (3)
= Prob [εil − εij ≤ wi(aj , pj, yi, si)− wi(al, pl, yi, si)] . (4)
Thus, the probability of choosing j amounts to the probability of the systematic utility
difference wi[j] − wi[l] dominating the ’noise’, εil − εij. The error terms {εil, εij} can
be assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variances σ2l and σ
2
j as well
as covariance σlj . Under these assumptions, ϕij := εil − εij is also normally distributed
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with mean zero and variance σ2 := Var[ϕij] = σ
2
l + σ
2
j − 2σlj . Thus, equation (4) can be
represented as
Pij = Φ
(
wi(aj , pj, yi, si)− wi(al, pl, yi, si)
σ
)
, (5)
where Φ(·) denotes the cdf of a standard normal distribution. This model is known as the
binary probit model [cf. Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985)]. Hensher et al. (1999) provide
empirical evidence that a linear specification of the function w(·) leads to good predictions
in its middle ranges. Therefore, one posits
wi(aj, pj, yi, si) = ci +
K∑
k=1
βkak + εij, (6)
where ci represents an individual-specific constant, ak, k = 1, . . . , K, are the attributes
of the alternative, and βk, k = 1, . . . , K, are the parameters to be estimated. These
parameters can be interpreted as the (constant) marginal utilities of the corresponding
attributes.
The marginal rate of substitution between two attributes m and n is given by
MRSm,n = −
∂v/∂am
∂v/∂an
. (7)
In the case of a linear utility function, this can be estimated by the ratio of the respective
slope parameters,
MRSm,n = −
βˆm
βˆn
,
representing the marginal WTP for an additional unit of am expressed in units of an.
Therefore, the marginal WTP for attribute am can be calculated by dividing the marginal
utility of this attribute by the marginal utility of the price attribute [in our context, the
income tax rate, see e.g. Telser (2002), p. 56]2:
MWTP(am) =
∂v/∂am
∂v/∂pj
. (8)
2By Roy’s Identity, xij = −
∂v(·)/∂pj
∂v(·)/∂yi
. Therefore, the (uncompensated) demand of individual i for
commodity j corresponds to the negative ratio of partial derivatives of the indirect utility function with
respect to price pj and income yi. In the present context, the optimal quantity demanded is equal to one,
i.e. xij = 1. Therefore, Roy’s Identity yields
∂v
∂yi
= − ∂v
∂pj
, i.e. the marginal utility of income is equal to
the negative derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to price.
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By limiting the specification to the product attributes only (simple model, cf. Section 5.1),
one obtains the following expression representing the difference in utility of individual i
between alternative j and the status quo l,
∆Vij = ci +
K∑
k=1
βk∆akj + βp∆pj + ϕij, (9)
where ∆ci = cij − cil, ∆akj = akj − akl, ∆pj = pj − pl, ϕij = εij − εil for each j 6= l.
For econometric inference, it is important to take into account that the same individual
makes several choices. A popular variant is the two-way random-effect specification, ϕij =
µi+ηij , where µi denotes the component that varies only across individuals but not across
the choice alternatives. The terms µi and ηij are assumed uncorrelated with the product
attributes (ai1, . . . , aiK) and between themselves. By a standard assumption in a probit
model, ση = 1. Hence Var[ϕij ] = σ
2
η + σ
2
µ = 1 + σ
2
µ and Corr[ϕij, ϕil] =
σ2µ
1+σ2µ
=: ρ. The
parameter ρ indicates how strongly the various responses are correlated with each other, or,
equivalently, the share of the total variance that is explained by the individual-specific error
term. The random-effects specification is justified if ρ is high and significant. Variances of
marginal WTP values can be computed using the delta method [cf. Hole (2007)].
3.2 Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted with a representative sample of 979 respondents in the fall
of 2008. Respondents were mailed full decision sets including graphical representations
of the status quo and alternatives and were asked to submit their binary choices during
a telephone survey a few days later. In order to make sure that decisions were based on
a homogeneous information set and made in a consistent way, respondents additionally
received a detailed description of the attributes and their possible realizations. The Ap-
pendix shows the graphical representation of the status quo (Exhibit 1) and two selected
alternatives (Exhibits 2 and 3). The telephone survey also included questions covering a
wide range of socioeconomic and behavioral characteristics of the respondents.
Prior to the experiment, the attributes and their levels used to define ‘income redistri-
11
bution’ had been checked in two pretests for their relevance. They form four groups (see
Table 1),
1. Shares of the total redistribution budget (to be spent on three groups, viz. Swiss
citizens, Western European foreigners, and other foreigners);
2. Shares of the total redistribution budget (to be spent on five groups of recipients,
viz. old-age pensioners, people with ill health, the unemployed, working poor, and
families with children);
3. Total amount of redistribution, defined as a share of GDP;
4. Share of personal income to be paid by the respondent as tax to finance redistribution
(the price attribute).
While economics suggests that the total amount of redistribution as a share of GDP (RE-
DIST in Table 1) should vary in step with the income tax as a share of personal income
(TAX), this parallelism would cause perfect multicollinearity between REDIST and TAX.
Yet the regression coefficient of TAX needs to be estimated with high precision because it
enters the calculation of all WTP values [see eq. (8)]. Fortunately, respondents did not
notice the lack of parallel changes in the two attributes.
The nine attributes and their levels result in a total number of possible scenarios that
cannot be realized in an experiment. Let the scenarios define the n rows of the observation
matrix X , with associated covariance matrix Ω = σ2 (X ′X)−1 of parameters β to be
estimated. Then, so-called D-efficient design calls for the minimization of the geometric
mean of the eigenvalues of Ω,
D efficiency =
(
|Ω|
1
K
)
−1
,
where K denotes the number of parameters to be estimated [cf. Carlsson and Martinsson
(2003)]. Using this optimization procedure and incorporating several restrictions, the num-
ber of alternatives was reduced to 35 and randomly split in five groups. One alternative
was included twice in each decision set for a consistency test, resulting in eight binary
choices per respondent.
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Attribute Label Status Quo Level Alternative Levels
Shares of benefits going to
• Swiss citizens CH 75% 60%, 85%
• Western European foreigners WEU 10% 5%, 10%, 20%
• Other foreigners OTH 15% 10%, 15%, 20%
Shares of benefits going to
• Working Poor WP 10% 5%, 15%
• Unemployed UNEMP 15% 5%, 25%
• Old-Age Pensioners PENS 45% 35%, 55%
• Families with Children FAM 5% 10%
• People with ill health ILL 25% 20%, 30%
Total amount of redistribution REDIST 25% (of GDP) 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%
Income tax TAX 25% (of personal income) 10%, 15%, 40%
Table 1: Attributes and their levels
4 Descriptive Statistics
4.1 Socioeconomic Characteristics
The sample consists of 979 Swiss citizens, 70 percent of them residing in the German-
speaking part and 30 percent in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. While 94 percent
are born in the country, six percent are foreign-born. 50 percent are men; 20 percent have a
monthly income below CHF 2,000 and 23 percent, above CHF 6,000; 27 percent are younger
than 36 while 29 percent are at least 60 years of age (see Table 2). These characteristics
reflect the structure of the Swiss population.
Age groups N % of valid answers
18-35 264 27
36-59 435 44
60 and older 280 29
Total valid answers 979 100
Sample 979
Table 2: Respondents’ age
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Unemployment expectation N % of valid answers
expect to be unemployed 97 10
do not expect 832 90
Total valid answers 929 100
Missing 50
Sample 979
Table 3: Expectation to become/stay unemployed within two years
Health status N % of valid answers
health problems 512 53
no health problems 458 47
Total valid answers 970 100
Missing 9
Sample 979
Table 4: Health status, also including family members
Some 10 percent of respondents expect to become or to stay unemployed within the
next two years (see Table 3). Further, when asked about the health status of their families,
53 percent of respondents stated that they themselves or their family members experience
health problems (see Table 4).
The structure of the sample permits to test Hypothesis 1, which emphasizes imperfect
altruism. Also, we can test Hypotheses 2 to 5, which are based on the view that income
redistribution serves an insurance function.
4.2 Respondents’ Choice Behavior
A total of 979 · 8 = 7, 832 choices were observed, of which not quite 20 percent were in
favor of an alternative over the status quo (see Table 5). This is a low percentage, for
which there are at least four explanations. First, in spite of checking in the pretests, the
levels of the attributes in the experiment may not have been sufficiently spread to induce
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Choices N in percent
alternative 1,562 19.94
status quo 6,088 77.73
no decision 182 2.32
Total 7,832 100
Table 5: Total number of choices
# choices for alternative No. in percent
0 209 21.35
1 309 31.56
2 226 23.08
3 131 13.38
4 57 5.82
5 16 1.63
6 10 1.02
7 0 0.00
8 5 0.51
Total valid answers 965 98.57
Missing 14 1.43
Sample 979 100
Table 6: Distribution of the numbers of chosen alternatives per respondent
respondents to switch. Second, some attributes (e.g. benefits going to the working poor;
see Table 7), may not have been sufficiently valued to cause switching. Third, there may
be errors in decision making because the consistency test revealed 14 percent of choices
to be inconsistent [which, however, is a value in the usual range, cf. e.g. Becker and
Zweifel (2008)]. Finally, there may be a strong status quo bias in the face of a complex
decision-making situation and the hypothetic nature of the alternative scenarios (see the
large negative constant in Table 7). Still, only 21 percent of respondents never opted for
an alternative (see Table 6), while almost 80 percent departed from the status quo at least
once. This is reflected by the fact that only 2 respondents indicated sufficient difficulties
in understanding the choice experiment.
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5 Estimation Results
5.1 Relevance of Product Attributes and Testing of Hypotheses
1 and 2
Estimation of eq. (9) calls for two adjustments in view of Table 1. First, let a respondent
allocate 15 percent of the redistributive budget to the working poor (WP), while opting
for 20 percent of the GDP being devoted to redistribution (REDIST). This implies that
the preferred share of GDP going to the working poor amounts to 3 percent in this case.
Let another respondent also allocate 15 percent of the total to WP but 40 percent to
REDIST. This time, the preferred share of the GDP in favor of WP is 6 percent. To
reflect this difference, WP needs to be replaced by W˜P = WP ·REDIST, and similarly
for the other shares of benefits listed in Table 1. The second adjustment is that the two
adding-up restrictions inherent in Table 1 need to be imposed,
W˜P+ ˜UNEMP+ I˜LL+ F˜AM + P˜ENS = REDIST (10)
C˜H+ W˜EU + O˜TH = REDIST. (11)
Being an important attribute on its own, REDIST needs to be included in the estimation.
This means that one of its components must be excluded from both eqs. (10) and (11). The
choice of exclusion restriction is arbitrary but might affect estimated WTP values3. This
effect is analogous to an omitted variable bias, whose size varies with the absolute value
of the pertinent coefficient [Greene (2000), p. 334]. Preliminary regressions indicated
that F˜AM has the highest coefficient, followed by W˜P, P˜ENS, ˜UNEMP, and finally
I˜LL. Similarly, C˜H was found to dominate W˜EU, which in turn dominated O˜TH. This
suggests the following regression strategy for implementing restriction (10). Start with
F˜AM, checking for omitted variable bias caused by excluding the less important attributes
3Note that the situation is not the same as selecting the reference category for a dummy variable in a
linear regression model, which is known to leave coefficient estimation unchanged. Since probit estimation
is non-linear, moving the reference value of the regressor up or down affects the estimated slope along the
sigmoid function.
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one at a time. Next, turn to second-ranking W˜P without excluding F˜AM because this
would cause an unnecessary amount of bias. By the same token, it would make little sense
to exclude F˜AM and W˜P when focus is on P˜ENS, and similarly for ˜UNEMP. The same
strategy was applied to restriction (11).
Variable Coeff. SE z P > |z| Marginal WTP,
effect % of inc.
Recipient’s Nationality
1. C˜H if W˜EU excluded 0.01494 0.01420 1.05 0.293 0.00381 0.73
2. C˜H if O˜TH excluded 0.10146 0.01819 5.58 0.000 0.02587 4.93
3. W˜EU if O˜TH excluded 0.08652 0.02682 3.23 0.001 0.02206 4.20
Recipients’ Social Group
4. F˜AM if W˜P excluded 0.05374 0.02805 1.92 0.055 0.01370 2.61
5. F˜AM if P˜ENS excluded 0.07942 0.02660 2.99 0.003 0.02025 3.86
6. F˜AM if ˜UNEMP excluded 0.09795 0.02751 3.56 0.000 0.02498 4.75
7. F˜AM if I˜LL excluded 0.15181 0.02975 5.10 0.000 0.03871 7.37
8. W˜P if P˜ENS excluded 0.02569 0.01708 1.50 0.133 0.00655 1.25
9. W˜P if ˜UNEMP excluded 0.04421 0.01740 2.54 0.011 0.01127 2.15
10. W˜P if I˜LL excluded 0.09808 0.02398 4.09 0.000 0.02501 4.76
11. P˜ENS if ˜UNEMP excluded 0.01853 0.00818 2.27 0.023 0.00472 0.90
12. P˜ENS if I˜LL excluded 0.07239 0.01693 4.28 0.000 0.01846 3.51
13. ˜UNEMP if I˜LL excluded 0.05387 0.01759 3.06 0.002 0.01374 2.61
TAX (for any specification) -0.02060 0.00180 -11.42 0.000 -0.00525 –
Constant (for any specification) -0.92929 0.02969 -31.30 0.000 - -45.11
Note: Bold entries show preferred specifications.
Table 7: Summary of random-effects probit estimates for different model specifications.
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For example, the WTP estimates entered on lines No. 1 and 12 of Table 7 are derived
from the model
∆V˜ij = c0 + β1W˜Pj + β2 ˜UNEMPj + β3I˜LLj + β4F˜AMj +
+β5C˜Hj + β6W˜EUj +
+β7REDISTj + β8TAXj + ϕij .
Estimation results are displayed in Tables 7 and 8. As was to be expected, the coef-
ficient and marginal effect of F˜AM are most strongly affected when second-ranking W˜P
is excluded. The preferred estimate appears on line No. 7, with I˜LL excluded. For W˜P,
it is the one on line No. 10, and for P˜ENS, on line No. 12. With regard to recipient’s
nationality, the estimate with smaller bias presumably is the one on line No. 3 rather than
No. 2. However, regardless of the exclusion restriction imposed, a higher share of the GDP
devoted to any of the types of beneficiaries and nationalities has positive utility, while the
price attribute (TAX) is negatively valued. Finally, the negative constant points to status
quo bias.
Hypothesis 1, revolving around imperfect altruism, is derived both from behavioral
economics and insurance theory. The preferred specifications (corresponding to lines No.
2 and No. 3 of Tables 7 and 8) indicate that WTP for redistribution is in favor of Swiss
citizens, followed by Western European nationals and to the detriment of other nationalities
(the dominated and hence residual category). Since the difference between the coefficients
is not significant, this constitutes partial confirmation only of Hypothesis 1, which predicts
a clear preference for redistribution benefitting Swiss nationals over one benefitting Western
Europeans.
Based on the preferred specifications (in lines 7, 10, 12, and 13 of Tables 7 and 8),
Hypothesis 2 receives a considerable measure of confirmation. Among the beneficiaries
that cannot count on insurance, families with children rank first, followed by the working
poor as predicted (the difference is significant). As to the beneficiaries enjoying insurance
protection, pensioners precede the unemployed, again as predicted (here, the difference is
insignificant). Contrary to Hypothesis 3, however, WTP for people with ill health is lowest
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of all4, causing them to be defined as the residual category (see above).
In favor of to the detriment of WTP in % of income WTP in CHF SE in CHF
1. CH WEU 0.73 33.47 37.97
2. CH OTH 4.93 227.31 54.61
3. WEU OTH 4.20 193.83 75.52
4. FAM WP 2.61 120.40 75.59
5. FAM PENS 3.86 177.94 71.82
6. FAM UNEMP 4.75 219.45 75.89
7. FAM ILL 7.37 340.13 83.55
8. WP PENS 1.25 57.55 45.64
9. WP UNEMP 2.15 99.05 47.54
10. WP ILL 4.76 219.73 66.34
11. PENS UNEMP 0.90 41.50 22.87
12. PENS ILL 3.51 162.19 47.76
13. UNEMP ILL 2.61 120.68 47.53
Constant -45.11 -2081.99 223.36
Note: Bold entries show preferred specifications.
Table 8: Mean marginal WTP values for reallocation of the redistributive budget between
two groups of beneficiaries (in % of monthly disposable income and in CHF, 1 CHF = 0.88
$ in December 2008)
The estimation results obtained in this section do not allow to identify the presence of
effects of imperfect altruism or insurance motivation. In order to be able to perform this
4A possible explanation for this result is the high amount of redistribution in Switzerland induced by
its premium subsidization scheme. While competitive social health insurers must apply community rating,
the insured receive a subsidy as soon as their premium exceeds a share of taxable income which varies
between 8 and 12 percent, depending on the canton. In addition, there is a risk adjustment scheme which
ultimately makes the ’good’ risks pay even more to the benefit of ’bad’ ones [see Zweifel and Frech (2016)].
Overall, respondents may have deemed redistribution in favor of people with ill health excessive in the
status quo.
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identification, we need to interact the attributes of income redistribution with socioeco-
nomic characteristics of the respondents. This calls for extensions of the basic model that
are analyzed below.
5.2 Extended Models: Testing Hypotheses 3 to 5
Hypotheses 3 to 5 of Section 2.2 make predictions regarding differences in WTP values
between groups of respondents. The covariates of interest are age, expectations about
unemployment, and family health status.
In order to estimate ceteris paribus effects, the attributes listed in Table 1 are interacted
first with AGE60+, a dummy variable indicating that the respondent is at least 60 years
old. This gives rise to a first of four sets of interaction terms extending eq. (12).
5.2.1 Extended Model 1: Age and Demand for Old-Age Pensions vs Family
Support (Hypothesis 3)
in favor of to the detriment of WTP in % of income WTP in CHF SE in CHF
(A) FAM PENS 5.13 231.89 83.80
(B) WP PENS 0.47 21.05 62.35
(C) PENS UNEMP 0.64 28.79 28.71
(D) PENS ILL 3.35 151.49 49.95
Table 9: Marginal WTP values for attributes (in % of monthly disposable average income
and CHF, 1 CHF = 0.88 $ in December 2008) derived for the age group 60 and older
Reestimation of equation (13) with all the attributes in linear and interacted form
(using AGE60+), imposing the exclusion in line No. 4 of Table 7, and using eq. (8) results
in the WTP values displayed in Table 9 (entries A, B, C, D correspond to entries 5, 8, 11,
12 in Tables 7 and 8). Among respondents aged 60 or more, WTP for reallocating 1 percent
of GDP to families to the detriment of pensioners amounts to 5.13 percent of the average
monthly income in the sample. This is even higher than the 3.86 percent across all groups
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(see line No. 5 of Tables 7 and 8). This is a contradiction of Hypothesis 3, stating that the
demand for redistribution favoring old-age pensioners is expected to be particularly high
in the group aged 60 and more. In turn, WTP for reallocating of 1 percent of GDP to
the working poor is lower in this group (0.47 percent compared to 1.25 percent of income
in line No. 8 of Table 8), but statistical significance is lacking. In the two cases where
pensioners stand to benefit, WTP values in lines C, D of Table 9 are again below those of
Table 8 (see lines No. 11 and 12). On the whole, Hypothesis 3 has to be rejected.
5.2.2 Extended Model 2: Employment Expectations and Demand for Unem-
ployment Support (Hypothesis 4)
in favor of to the detriment of WTP in % of income WTP in CHF SE in CHF
(E) WP UNEMP 5.34 264.80 118.86
(F) PENS UNEMP 1.02 50.73 45.27
(G) FAM UNEMP -4.12 -204.32 157.61
(H) UNEMP ILL -0.88 -43.73 91.43
Table 10: Marginal WTP values for attributes (in % of monthly disposable average income)
derived for the respondents who expect to be unemployed during the next two years
This time, equation (13) is complemented with all attributes interacted with the dummy
variable UEXP , indicating that the respondent expects to become or remain unemployed
during the next two years. This extended model allows a test of Hypothesis 4, stating
that the demand for unemployment support is particularly high among respondents with
expectations to lose their job or to remain unemployed. Here, we observe two statistically
significant differences in preferences between respondents with these expectations and oth-
ers (entries E, F, G, H in Table 10 correspond to entries 9, 11, 6, 13 in Table 8, respectively).
Marginal WTP for a reallocation of 1 percent of GDP from the unemployed to families with
children exhibited by this group (line G) is -4.12 percent of monthly income, significantly
lower than for the general population (4.75 percent, line 6), thus supporting the hypoth-
esis. However, when it comes to the question of whether the social budget should more
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strongly benefit the unemployed to the detriment of people with ill health (line H), those
who expect to be unemployed are surprisingly against this as well, exhibiting a marginal
WTP of -0.88 compared to +2.61 percent of monthly disposable income in the general
population (line 13 of Table 8). Thus, Hypothesis 4 cannot be accepted in its entirety.
5.2.3 Extended Model 3: Health Status and Demand for Support of People
with Ill Health (Hypothesis 5)
in favor of to the detriment of WTP in % of income WTP in CHF SE in CHF
(I) WP ILL 4.41 202.93 65.62
(K) UNEMP ILL 3.09 142.11 43.57
(L) PENS ILL 3.57 164.60 42.22
(M) FAM ILL 6.51 299.79 82.67
Table 11: Marginal WTP values for attributes (in % of monthly disposable average income)
derived for the respondents who experience health problems among their relatives
Finally, we consider an extension of the basic model by including the dummy variable
ILLFAM for the health status of respondents’ family members and themselves. Hypoth-
esis 5 states that WTP for redistribution in favor of people in ill health is expected to be
especially high among those who experience health problems, including their close rela-
tives. However, estimation results (see Table 11 with entries I, K, L, M corresponding to
entries 10, 13, 12, 7 of Table 8) suggest that family health status does not have an impact
on preferences for the composition of the redistribution portfolio. For example, respon-
dents with health problems have a WTP amounting to 4.41 percent of average income for
redistributing income in favor of the working poor to the detriment of people with ill health
(line I), no different from the 4.76 percent in the general population (line 10 of Table 8).
The ‘no difference’ finding also holds true for the other three ways to distribute income
away from the unemployed (lines K, L, M of table 11 compared to lines 13, 12, 7 of Table
8). Therefore, Hypothesis 5 is not confirmed.
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6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we elicited Swiss citizens’ willingness to pay (WTP) for the composition of
the public redistributive budget through a Discrete Choice experiment performed in 2008.
The theoretical background is provided both by the insurance and the imperfect altruism
motivation for income redistribution, resulting in five hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 states that WTP for redistribution in favor of Swiss citizens is highest,
followed by immigrants from Western European countries and from the remaining coun-
tries. It is partially confirmed in that WTP in favor of the first two groups dominates that
in favor of recipients from other parts of the world, but without the predicted difference
between Swiss and Western European nationals.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that WTP for redistribution is particularly high if beneficiaries
are exposed to major risks that are not insured, namely to have children and to belong to
the working poor in the case of Switzerland. Beneficiaries facing a risk that is mitigated
by mandatory insurance (illness, unemployment, old age) are predicted to trigger lower
WTP for redistribution. Since this ranking is confirmed with one exception, Hypothesis 2
receives a good deal of empirical support.
Hypothesis 3, predicting the demand for redistribution favoring old-age pensioners to
be highest among those close to or beyond retirement age, has to be rejected. Hypothesis
4, stating that the demand for unemployment support is especially marked among respon-
dents expecting to be unemployed, can only be confirmed with respect to the trade-off
between the unemployed and families with children. Hypothesis 5, stating that WTP for
redistribution in favor of people with ill health is particularly high among those who ex-
perience health problems including their close relatives, cannot be confirmed due to a lack
of statistical significance.
On the whole, the insurance motive as an explanation of the demand for income re-
distribution receives limited empirical support in this study. This is the more remarkable
as the design of this Discrete Choice Experiment permits respondents to express their
preferences not only concerning the total amount of redistribution but also with regard
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to the allocation of the available funds to competing uses. It is in this second context
where the insurance motive should become important in principle because individuals can
predict to some extent the allocation that may be in their future interest. The failure to
find the predicted effects points to other motives for income redistribution, in particular
‘pure’ altruism among the aged in favor of younger segments of the population who bear
the burden of raising a family while facing the risks of becoming a working poor and a
person with ill health. That altruism, at least of the ‘imperfect’ variety, may be at work
is indicated by the fact that there is positive WTP for redistribution in favor of Western
European migrants to Switzerland.
In sum, the view of income redistribution as a way of providing insurance against a
miserable life at the bottom of the income distribution receives empirical support from this
experiment, but only to the extent that WTP values broadly reflect the degree to which
recipients are exposed to risks not covered by social insurance. The more specific variant of
this insurance view, relating types of beneficiaries (e.g. pensioners) to respondents’ current
status (e.g. age above 60) has to be rejected.
In addition, the finding that Swiss preferences for redistribution are tilted against mi-
grants from culturally distant countries suggests an important role for imperfect altruism.
It would be worthwhile to explore the precise role of this type of altruism in future work.
While perfect altruism does not put constraints on how to slice the pie in public redistri-
bution policy, imperfect altruism conditions citizens’ support of policy on the perceived
cultural distance between financiers and beneficiaries. However, a suggestion for policy
that can be drawn from the available evidence is that programs designed to modify the
distribution of income need to take the cultural distance between payers and (foreign)
beneficiaries into account in order to find the support of a majority of citizens.
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A Appendix
Exhibit 1: Status Quo Card (current state of redistribution)
    Tax Rate              Amount of Redistribution
25% of your 
income 25% of GDP
 Use of Redistribution  Nationality of Beneficiaries  
         
            
citizens of 
Western
European
states
10% 
citizens of other 
states
15%
Swiss
citizens
75%
old-age
pensioners 
45%
families 
with
children 5% 
people
with ill 
health
25%
unemployed
15%
working
poor  10% 
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Exhibit 2: Card for Alternative No. 1
        Tax Rate  Amount of Redistribution
   Uses of Redistribution             Nationality of Beneficiaries
                                                                            
  Swiss 
citizens
60%
citizens of 
Western European 
states
20%
citizens of 
other states 
          20% 
old-age
pensioners 
      55%
working
poor 15% 
families 
with
children
5%
people with 
ill health 
       20%
25% of your 
income
20% of GDP 
unemployed 
5%
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Exhibit 3: Card for Alternative No. 2
    Tax Rate   Amount of Redistribution
15% of your 
income 10% of GDP
    Uses of Redistribution            Nationality of Beneficiaries
                                                                                         
Swiss citizens 
75%
citizens of 
Western
European states 
10% 
citizens of 
other states 
            15% 
old-age
pensioners 
45%
people
with ill 
health
30%
unemployed 
15%
working
poor
5%
families with 
children 5% 
31
